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Abstract 
The seminal study by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) (BLL hereafter) found that the 
moving average rule had strong predictive power over 90 years in the DJIA, and this result 
was confirmed by Hudson et al. (1996) for the FT30 in the UK and Chen et al. (2009) for the 
TOPIX in Japan. However, according to the Adaptive Market Hypothesis, trading rules are 
only likely to be successful for a limited period of time and, as investors and markets adapt, 
their predictive power will diminish. We examine the moving average (MA) rule using post-
BLL (1987-2013) data and find that after 1986 the rule’s predictive power has diminished in 
all three markets. We investigate the exact process behind the weakening of the predictive 
power of moving average rules and find that post-1987 markets react to new buy/sell signals 
not on the days those signals are generated, but the day before. In support of this finding, we 
show that trading strategies based on anticipation of signals would have yielded superior 
profits to investors. Hence, trading on anticipated signals constitutes a feasible explanation of 
price reactions to future, one-day-ahead new signals, and thus in line with the Adaptive 
Market Hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction   
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been one of the most studied and respected 
theories in the academic finance literature since its formulation in the 1960s. According to the 
weak form of the EMH, stock prices reflect all available information in past prices, such that 
technical analysis trading rules based on historical price data are unprofitable (Fama 1970).   
However, in recent years, and especially following Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron, (1992) 
(BLL hereafter), there has been an explosion of studies that find that technical trading rules 
based on historical data do possess significant power in forecasting stock returns. The BLL 
study investigates the profitability of the moving average (MA hereafter) and trading range 
break rules using DJIA data in the period 1897 to 1986 and finds that the MA rule has had 
high predictive power over the 90 years period. These results have been examined in great 
detail and generally found to be quite robust and to hold in many other markets, including the 
UK and Japan. Studies have analysed the robustness of those results to data snooping bias1, 
transaction costs2, or out-of sample performance. On the latter issue, a number of studies find 
profits from the rules applied by BLL to be non-existent in the period following that paper 
(e.g., Lebaron, 2000; Schulmeister 2009; Fang et al., 2013, and Taylor, 2014, for risk-
adjusted profits). Some authors attribute this decline in profits to the original results having 
been spurious in the first place (due to data snooping: Ready, 2002, Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 
2012, biases in closing prices due to nonsynchronous trading: Day and Wang, 2002, or to 
other statistical biases: Fang et al., 2013). Others attribute the decline to an increase in market 
efficiency (Sullivan et al., 1999).  
 
The objective of our study is to examine in detail how the predictive ability of the rules have 
declined and the implications of this decline for general models of market behaviour.  A 
decline in the predictive ability of the rules is not incompatible with the broad notion of 
market efficiency but particular patterns of decline may be more compatible with the 
Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH hereafter) proposed by Lo (2004). The AMH enables 
predictability from technical rules to co-exist with the EMH in an intellectually consistent 
manner. This theory states that investment strategies can be successful or unsuccessful, 
depending on the particular market environment. Contrary to the EMH, the AMH implies that 
                                                          
1 Sullivan et al. (1999) find the profits reported in Brock et al. (1992) to be sustained even after an adjustment 
for data snooping, whereas Ready (2002) applies a different adjustment method and finds the significant profits 
in Brock et al. (1992) to be spurious. 
2 For instance, Bessembinder and Chan (1998) argue that profits in Brock et al. (1992) would be fully offset by 
transaction costs. 
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the performance of investment strategies may decline for a time and then return to 
profitability, when environmental conditions become more conducive to such strategies. A 
consequence of this implication is that market efficiency is not an all-or-nothing condition, 
but varies continuously over time and across markets. Lo (2004) argues that convergence to 
some ideal state of efficiency is neither guaranteed nor likely to occur.  We find results 
compatible with the AMH in that, whilst the predictive power of the rules have declined, 
which is consistent with EMH, this decline drives other market changes and so cannot be 
interpreted as a simple move towards efficiency. 
 
We achieve the objective of our study by examining the evolution of the MA rule in three 
major financial markets over the period subsequent to the study by BLL. Specifically, we 
firstly examine the performance of the original MA rules to establish whether they possess 
predictive abilities and outperform the buy-and-hold strategy. We find that the MA rule is no 
longer significantly predictive for the DJIA (US market) and FT30 (UK market), and that the 
level of predictability in the TOPIX (Japanese market) has diminished since the end of the 
investigation period used by BLL (1992). These findings could be argued to be consistent 
with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, since the rule is no longer predictive and the market 
has become ‘efficient’ in this respect. Secondly, and more importantly, we shed light onto 
how exactly the market adapted to the knowledge of the effectiveness of the rules. To this 
end, we analyse differences in return behaviour around days when technical trading rules 
generate new buy or sell signals, in the pre- vs. post-BLL samples. The results support the 
notion of investors not only having learned to react immediately to new signals from 
technical trading rules, but also to anticipate those signals successfully. To further investigate 
whether anticipation of trading rule signals could have yielded superior returns to investors in 
the post-BLL period (who, e.g., might have learned about and started acting upon the BLL 
results), we suggest a version of the MA rule whereby investors predict the trading signal on 
the following day and trade on that signal today. We find that the trading based on this 
modified rule outperforms the original MA rule in the post-BLL period, suggesting 
profitability of technical trading conditional on the level of investors’ forecasting ability. 
Thus, our results taken as a whole provide support for the AMH. A previously successful 
trading rule is no longer successful as investors have driven away its profitability. However, 
investors who can adapt the rule and predict the signal it would give on the next day can still 
successfully use a modified version of the rule. This is in line with the AMH which suggests 
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that market participants are always competing and adapting within the market and that new 
investment strategies will replace old strategies once the former ones are no longer profitable. 
 
This study does not attempt to answer the question of what exactly were the factors which 
contributed to the observed decline in the forecasting performance of the MA rules post-
1986. As mentioned earlier, some authors argued that technical trading predictability was 
always spurious or non-existent when transaction costs have been accounted for. Assuming 
the BLL results were not spurious and could have been exploited given reasonable 
transaction costs, the decline of technical trading profitability could be due to an increase in 
market efficiency (Sullivan et al., 1999). This again could be driven by advances in 
information technology and computing power facilitating investment analysis and order 
executions; development of derivatives markets which have been shown elsewhere to 
positively affect the efficiency of price formation on spot markets; or an increase in the 
fraction of trades by sophisticated institutional traders who also face low transaction costs. 
Lastly, we entertain the possibility that traders have learned about the profitability of 
technical trading as unveiled in the BLL study and started to trade on those rules in the post-
1986 period, which resulted in the decline of the predictive performance of those rules. In this 
study, however, we investigate the mechanism but not the causes of the decline in predictive 
power of the original MA rules. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A review of the relevant literature relating to 
technical analysis in general, the MA rule in particular, and the AMH is presented in Section 
2. Section 3 explains the methodology of the different MA rules examined and the two 
trading rules implemented while Section 4 presents our hypotheses. Section 5 presents the 
data while empirical results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 summarises the findings and 
provides conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Technical Analysis 
Technical analysis has a long history of widespread use by participants in financial markets 
(Park and Irwin, 2007; Lo and Hasanhodiz, 2010). Menkhoff (2010) finds that the vast 
majority of fund managers use technical analysis and it is preferred to fundamental analysis. 
Academics have tended to be sceptical about the use of technical analysis. The scepticism can 
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be linked to the early negative empirical findings regarding the profitability of various 
technical rules in stock markets (Fama and Blume, 1966, Van Horne and Parker, 1967, 1968, 
Jensen and Benington, 1970). However, due to more recent positive findings regarding 
technical analysis rules, there has been a great increase in the literature on technical analysis 
since the mid-1990s, with Park and Irwin (2007) noting that half of all empirical studies 
conducted after 1960 were published during the period 1995-2004.  
 
2.2 The MA Rule in the US, UK and Japan. 
The MA rule is one of the most popular technical trading rules amongst practitioners and has 
been extensively studied in the academic literature. One of the first papers to investigate the 
MA rule was by Cootner (1962) who found that it was much more successful than a simple 
buy-and-hold strategy if gross profits are considered. However due to the high frequency of 
trading, the rule is much inferior after allowing for transaction costs. These results were 
further supported by Van Horne and Parker (1967; 1968), and James (1968).  
 
The study by BLL is one of the most influential works on technical trading rules. The 
influence is due to the strong findings of consistent and positive results about the forecasting 
power of technical trading rules, the use of a long price history (90 years of the DJIA) and the 
application for the first time of the model-based bootstrap method. BLL applied the MA rule 
to the DJIA data over the 1897-1986 period and the results indicate that buy (sell) signals 
from the MA rule generates positive (negative) returns across all 26 rules and four sub-period 
tested. Thus all the buy-sell differences are positive and outperform buy-and-hold returns. All 
the buy-sell spreads are also positive with an annual return of 19%, which compares 
favourably with buy-and-hold returns of 5%. Moreover buy signals generate higher average 
returns than sell signals and have a lower standard deviation than sell signals. This implies 
that technical trading returns cannot be explained by risk. However, the authors do not adjust 
for transaction costs, so their results are not sufficient to prove that the MA rules generate net 
returns greater than the simple buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
The results from BLL have been subject to considerable scrutiny. Bessembinder and Chan 
(1998) investigate the profitability of the rules by examining the same trading rules as BLL 
for dividend-adjusted DJIA data over the sample period 1926-1991. Incorporating dividends 
tends to reduce the returns on short sales and thus decreases the technical trading returns. To 
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avoid data snooping, they test the profitability and significance of the returns of the trading 
rules on portfolios as well as individual stocks. Even given break-even transaction costs have 
declined over time, they find that the transaction costs outweigh the returns. Further, Sullivan 
et al. (1999) examine the results of BLL by applying a bootstrap reality check for the same 
sample period. They find that the results are not due to data snooping. However, the out-of-
sample results are not so successful and the authors conclude that market efficiency has 
improved in recent years. Ready (2002) also studies the BLL results by comparing the BLL 
MA rules to technical trading rules formed by genetic programming and finds the best BLL 
trading rule for the 1963-1986 sample period produces significantly higher excess returns 
than the average of the trading rules recognized by the genetic programming. However, the 
BLL MA rule is less successful than the genetically generated rules over the 1957-1962 
period. Thus, Ready argues that investors would have been unlikely to choose the BLL MA 
rule at the end of 1962 given its relatively poor performance and the results attributable to 
data snooping. Furthermore, Day and Wang (2002) re-examine BLL findings by adjusting for 
both dividends and the interest earned on the proceeds from short sales. They show that 
adjusting for transaction costs and the impact of nonsynchronous prices on the reported 
closing levels of the DJIA eliminates the profits, reducing both the differential returns 
following buy and sell signals, and that the risk-adjusted excess profits are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, Atanasova and Hudson (2010) update the BLL results to include data 
from the DJIA from 1897 to 2009. They find MA rules to be highly predictive on data 
adjusted to remove calendar effects data and conclude that the removal of calendar effects 
does not make the rules insignificant. Shynkevich (2012) studies technical trading rules that 
are adjusted for data snooping bias on the technology industry and small cap sector portfolios 
from 1995-2010. They find that the MA rule does outperform a buy-and-hold strategy over 
the first half of the sample, but cannot outperform the buy-and-hold strategy during the 
second half of the sample. Fang et al. (2013) examine the DJIA and S&P500 out-of-sample 
data, both pre-and post-dating the original BLL sample, and find no evidence of statistical 
predictability in any of these additional periods.  Recently, Taylor (2014) studies the 
performance of the technical trading rules of BLL over the period 1928-2012 on all members 
of the DJIA.  The study finds that the risk-adjusted profits available from technical trading 
rules evolve slowly over time and consistent with the AMH, the risk-adjusted profits are 
confined to particular episodes primarily from the mid-1960s to mid-1980s, and that the risk-
adjusted profits rely on the ability of investors to short-sell stocks.   
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The MA rule has also been examined in many other markets, including the UK and Japan. In 
the UK, Hudson et al. (1996) examine BLL’s methodology on the FT30 from 1935 to 1994. 
Although they confirm that these rules have predictive power, they do not generate excess 
returns after taking account of transaction costs. Fifield et al. (2005) study the MA rule in 11 
European stock markets (including the UK) from 1991 to 2000 and found that none of the 
rules examined outperformed the simple buy-and-hold strategy, suggesting deterioration in 
the profitability of the MA rule. Further, Metghalchi et al. (2012) examine the profitability of 
the MA rule in 16 European stock markets (including the UK) from 1990 to 2006. They find 
that the simple MA rule does have predictive power in all of the countries and that the two 
trading strategies studied do beat the buy-and-hold strategy.  
 
Evidence from Japan has been sparse and mixed. Bessembinder and Chan (1995) find that the 
MA rules have explanatory power in all five Asian markets considered, with the explanatory 
power greater in three emerging markets (Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan) than more 
developed markets (Hong Kong and Japan). However, when transaction costs are considered, 
any gains from these trading strategies are eliminated. Ito (1999) also investigates the trading 
rules used by BLL on the national equity indices of six Pacific-Basin countries. The results 
show that the rules have predictive power in Japan, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico and Taiwan, 
but not in the US. Chong and Ng (2008) study the Nikkei 225 from 1985 to 2006 and also 
split the whole subsample into two using the year 2000 as the cut-off year. They find the MA 
rule has no predictive power in any of the samples thus indicating the efficiency of the 
Japanese stock market in this respect. Further Chen et al. (2009) examine various technical 
trading rules from 1975 to 2006 in eight Asian markets (including the TOPIX) and find that 
the short term MA rules are the most profitable for all markets when no transaction costs are 
implemented. However when transaction costs are taken into account, the most profitable 
rules are the long-run MA rules, although there is a substantial decline in trading profits. 
 
2.3 The Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH) 
The AMH has gained increasing attention and support in the recent academic literature. Lim 
and Brooks (2006) examine the evolving efficiency of developed and developing stock 
markets through the portmanteau bicorrelation test statistic and find that the degree of market 
efficiency varies through time in a cyclical fashion. Todea et al. (2009) investigate the 
profitability of the MA strategy over time windows using linear and nonlinear tests and find 
that returns are not constant over time, but rather episodic. Ito and Sugiyama (2009) study the 
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time-varying autocorrelation of monthly S&P500 returns and show that the degree of market 
efficiency varies over time. Kim et al. (2011) examine the AMH using the return 
predictability of the DJIA from 1900 to 2009 and find strong evidence that return 
predictability fluctuates over time in a similar way to that described by Lo and that the US 
market has become more efficient after 1980. Smith (2012) investigates the adaptive nature 
of eighteen European stock markets and find that each of the markets provides evidence of 
the time-varying nature of return predictability, which is consistent with the adaptive markets 
hypothesis. Lim et al. (2013) show that the three major US indices have time-varying 
properties using a rolling window AR and WBAVR test and argue that markets must go 
through periods of efficiency and inefficiency. Further, Urquhart and Hudson (2013) examine 
the AMH through linear and nonlinear tests for dependence of the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX 
over a very long period. They find strong evidence of the AMH through the linear tests; 
however, the nonlinear tests show strong evidence of dependence throughout every 
subsample of each three markets.  Zhou and Lee (2013) examine the predictability of REIT 
returns and find that it is time varying and declines over time, which is influenced by market 
conditions.  Hull and McGroarty (2014) study 22 emerging markets over a 16-year sample 
using the Hurst-Mandelbrot-Wallis rescaled range test on stock returns and volatility.  They 
find strong evidence of long memory persistence in volatility over time which is consistent 
with the AMH.  Manahov and Hudson (2014) develop various artificial stock markets using a 
special adaptive form of the Strongly Typed Genetic Programming based learning algorithm 
applied to data from the FTSE 100, S&P 500 and Russell 3000 and find that the stock market 
dynamics are better explained by the AMH than the EMH since different trader populations 
behave as an efficient adaptive system evolving over time.  Furthermore, Urquhart and 
McGroarty (2014) study four well-known calendar anomalies from 1900 to 2013 and show 
that each anomaly behaves in a way consistent with the AMH. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, we firstly present the definition of the MA rule which was applied in BLL and 
subsequent studies. Next, we explain how the anticipation of future buy and sell signals by 
investors would result in a modification of the MA rule. Lastly, we introduce trading 
strategies based on those anticipated signals. 
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3.1. Moving Average (MA) rule 
A moving average is an average of observations of the level of an index over several 
consecutive time periods. The standard MA rule generates buy (sell) signals on which the 
investor act. This strategy recommends buying (or selling) on a day when the short-period 
moving average rises above (or falls below) the long-period moving average. Thus buy and 
sell signals are generated by crossovers of a long moving average (calculated over L days) by 
a short moving average (S days, S < L). The buy signal is generated when the short-period 
moving average moves higher than the long-period moving average: 
 
 � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−(𝜆𝜆−1)𝑆𝑆
𝜆𝜆=1
𝑆𝑆� � > � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−(𝜆𝜆−1)𝐿𝐿
𝜆𝜆=1
𝐿𝐿� � + 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ⇒ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎 (1) 
 
Where Pt is the price at time t. Sell signals are generated when the inequality is reversed: 
 
 � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−(𝜆𝜆−1)𝑆𝑆
𝜆𝜆=1
𝑆𝑆� � < � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−(𝜆𝜆−1)𝐿𝐿
𝜆𝜆=1
𝐿𝐿� � − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ⇒ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎 (2) 
 
When the short-term moving average remains above (below) the long-term moving average 
on subsequent days, technically “buy” (“sell”) signals are generated but no trading takes 
place. Rather, the initial position is maintained.3 Hence, trading only takes place following 
the initial, but not subsequent, signals. A percentage band may be included to reduce the 
number of signals by eliminating “whiplash” signals when the short and long period moving 
averages are close4. A popular MA rule in the literature is the (1,200), where the short period 
is one day and the long period is 200 days. However for completeness, three other common 
variations of the rule are used, namely the (1,50), (1,150) and (1,200). The shorter the size of 
the moving average, the closer it follows the market, and the longer the size of the moving 
average, the more it smooth’s market fluctuations. Thus a rule with S = 1 is very responsive, 
                                                          
3 This position depends on the exact trading strategy being implemented. In a simple case, one could go long in 
an asset following an initial buy signal and remain long as long as “buy” signals are being generated on 
subsequent days, go and remain short given “sell” signals. Other strategies are possible, however, e.g. as 
discussed in Section 3.3.  
4 Generally a 1% band is used in the literature. 
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that is, whenever the actual returns rises above (below) the moving average, the signal is to 
buy (sell).5  
 
3.2. Anticipation of MA signals 
Informed investors may become aware of the substantial returns available after a new buy or 
sell signal has been generated and begin to anticipate signals to take advantage of the 
expected price movements. To establish the maximum gains from trading on perfectly 
anticipated next day’s signals, we devise a hypothetical trading rule. This perfectly 
anticipated MA rule perfectly predicts the signal which will be generated by the original MA 
rule on the following day and trades on that signal today already, to take advantage of the 
expected price movements. Clearly, perfect prediction is not possible without knowledge of 
the future, so this rule can be regarded as a benchmark for the maximum benefits obtainable 
from predicting signals rather than a proposal for an implementable trading rule. This allows 
us to consider the incentives for investors to act to anticipate signals. In reality, the actual, 
realised returns would vary across investors who possess different forecasting skills, over 
time, and with market conditions, but be lower than those under perfect foresight.  However, 
a certain, albeit imperfect, level of predictive accuracy is quite possible since the long run 
moving average is often very different from the current price and so it is fairly certain what 
the following day’s signal is going to be6. If we take, for example, a situation where today’s 
index price is 50 and the associated moving average is 45, tomorrow’s signal is highly likely 
to be a buy signal as well.  It would take a large change in price (a change of greater than 
10%) for a sell signal to be generated, which is extremely unlikely. 
3.3. Trading strategies 
An important question when dealing with any technical trading rule is whether an investor 
can utilise the rule to generate returns greater than the market. Thus, the degree to which 
investors can earn profits that beat the buy-and-hold strategy using two simple trading 
strategies is analysed.  
                                                          
5 It is implicitly assumed that investors can trade at the closing price on the day the signal is generated. In real 
life, it would be possible if trading took place after the closing price has been announced, maybe OTC. 
Alternatively, as Ready (2002) argues, investors can anticipate the closing price, and hence the signal, shortly 
before the closing price is observed, as the price is not likely to move significantly in the last few minutes of 
trading. 
6 We also considered an imperfectly anticipated rule, whereby investors can perfectly predict future signals if 
the gap between future close and future MA is large, but not if this gap is small. In the latter case, investors are 
uncertain about what the next day’s signal is actually going to be and follow the present, not future, signal 
instead. Not surprisingly, the empirical results for the imperfect rule tend to show lower profits than those for 
the perfectly anticipated signals (not reported to conserve space but available on request). 
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In the first strategy, the investor is initially assumed to hold a buy position and the investor to 
hold the buy until a new sell signal is generated. Upon this new sell signal, the trader sells 
and goes out of the market until the next new buy signal. Upon the last sell signal, it is 
assumed that the investor liquidates his position. At the end of the sample period, the profit 
from the different trading rules are calculated and compared with the profit from the naïve 
buy-and-hold strategy.  
 
The second trading strategy examined follows the “double or out” rule suggested by 
Bessembinder and Chan (1998). If a neutral signal is generated, there is an investment in the 
index. If a buy day is indicated, the investment in the index is doubled whereas, if a sell day 
is indicated, the funds are invested in cash, thus broadly giving a similar risk to that of a buy-
and-hold strategy. Bessembinder and Chan (1998) assume investors earn the daily risk-free 
rate when a sell signal is generated, but since no risk-free rates are available for long periods 
of the data we examine, to be conservative we assume ‘our’ investor invests in cash with no 
return when a sell signal is generated.  The roundtrip breakeven costs are calculated for both 
strategies and represent the percentage roundtrip trading costs that would eliminate the 
difference between the rule profits and the buy-and-hold strategy7. 
 
4. Market Adaptation Hypotheses 
The fact that the MA rule was successful for such a long period of time suggests that the rule 
is picking up some intrinsic properties of the market, e.g., an upward (downward) trend in 
prices whose inception is indicated by the new buy (sell) signal. This property might have 
been unknown to investors in general before 1987 but since then, more investors may have 
begun to implement the rule into their investment strategy (maybe as a result of the 
publication of the BLL study). The situation before the rule became known is illustrated in a 
stylised way in Figure 1. For simplicity of exposition, the figure assumes that investors are 
risk neutral and the discount rate is 0. Furthermore, all price movements not predicted by the 
rules are random and not illustrated in the figure. The overall expected return for investors 
not aware of the rule, who buy and hold or who randomly buy or sell without reference to the 
rule, is 0. The solid line in the figure represents pre-BLL expected price movements: trends in 
price which generate superior returns to MA rules if one buys at any time during the buy 
                                                          
7 We only report the “double or out” trading strategy to conserve space but results from the simple trading 
strategy are available upon request. 
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periods, ideally at its inception (local minimum). Similarly, negative returns are generated if 
one buys at any time during the sell periods.  
 
[Figures 1 and 2 around here] 
 
When the rule becomes popular among investors, given the EMH, one would expect the 
excess returns it generates to be ultimately arbitraged away and the market price to settle at 
the equilibrium price. 8 However, it is not clear how the move to equilibrium might be 
achieved in practice and indeed whether equilibrium will ever be achieved. After the rule 
becomes known, some investors would want to take advantage of this new information. If 
more investors follow the MA rule, it will result in more buying (selling) pressure on the 
price when a buy (sell) signal is generated. Thus, prices will go up (down) more than they 
would have done before the MA rules become popular among investors. This means that the 
stock will become more (less) expensive than it would have been previously, due to the 
higher buying (selling) pressure at the start of the buy (sell) period (compared to the era when 
MA rules were not widely traded upon). 
 
The dashed line in Figure 1 represents post-BLL price movements if there was an immediate 
and perfect reaction to new buy/sell signals, in the sense that investors collectively anticipate 
the next maximum/minimum price correctly. No profits are then possible if one buys during 
the buy or sell period. Profits are only possible to those who react first to the new signals, but 
as signals are public information and, for now, we are assuming that no investor can 
consistently predict, or anticipate, those signals, no investor should be assumed to be able to 
systematically be among the first to react. Hence, the widespread use of MA rules, e.g., due 
to the knowledge of BLL findings, could have changed the behaviour of prices, resulting in 
the impossibility of systematically obtaining profits from strategies based on MA rules. 
A key factor that is unknown is what proportion of investors would start to follow the rule 
after it became generally known. The consequences of relatively large or small numbers of 
investors becoming involved are quite different and can generate different scenarios with the 
                                                          
8 For the ease of exposition, we will be assuming here that the MA rule became more popular among investors 
because they have learned about its profitability from the results in BLL study. This is a rhetorical devicefigure 
and one could equally attribute the increased popularity of MA rules to lower transaction costs due to advances 
in information and communication technology, increased efficiency due to trading in derivatives, increased 
importance of institutional investors, etc. it is not to say that wWe do not see the publication of the BLL paper as 
the only possible cause behind the potential increased implementation of MA rules.  
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dashed line in Figure 1 being but one possibility. Here, we discuss the various potential price 
adjustments and theoretical arguments underlying those scenarios, with corresponding price 
paths around a buy signal shown in Figure 2. The price path in the pre-BLL era is represented 
by the solid line A (as before, random movements in prices around trends are ignored for 
simplicity of exposition), an upward trend in price occurs on day t=0, which triggers a new 
buy signal. If there was no significant change post-1986 in investors’ behaviour and, 
consequently, in price movements around days when new buy signals are generated, the price 
path should be identical to that observed in the BLL sample (as represented by line A). 
Hence, on any day t = -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, … around a new buy (sell) signal, daily returns in the 
BLL and the post-BLL samples should not be statistically different from each other 
(graphically, the price curves for BLL and post-BLL periods are identical and perfectly 
overlapping).  
 
However, the publication of the BLL, paper or another event occurring around the same time, 
(see footnote 129) could have affected investors’ behaviour. On days when a new buy signal 
is generated (and potentially on subsequent days), with investors knowing that buying after a 
buy signal yields superior returns, one could expect the investors to increase their purchases 
of the asset in question. This would result in a higher price than what otherwise (i.e., pre-
1987) would have been observed, i.e., in a price curve different from the one given by A. For 
instance, if investors rush to buy an asset they observe to generate a new buy signal at t=0, its 
price could be bid up on day 0, resulting in a higher price level as compared to the pre-1987 
era, when none of these extra buyer-initiated trades would have taken place. Curve B 
represents a hypothetical case where investors (and the price) react strongly, but not 
immediately, to a buy signal at day 0.  This can be considered to be an overreaction if the 
initial price reaction is partially reversed in subsequent periods. The resulting returns are first 
higher and then lower than those which would have been observed in the pre-1987 era (curve 
B initially with a higher gradient and subsequently with a lower (and negative) gradient 
relative to curve A). Another possible, although unlikely, scenario is that investors correctly 
assess the anticipated future price of the asset (given the future trend) and bid up its price 
immediately to this level. This scenario is represented by curve C and is equivalent to that 
depicted by the dashed line in figure 1. Here, due to the instantaneous reaction of the market 
to the new buy signal, returns at t=0 are positive and higher and all returns following day 0 
are lower than in the pre-1987 scenario (curve C rises at t=0 and is flatter than A for t =1, 2, 
…). Another possible outcome is that investors underreact to the new buy signal, at t=0, 
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hence their buying pressure exerts a somewhat muted impact on the price, resulting in a 
gradual price rise (curve D). Hence, daily returns following day 0 would be initially higher 
and subsequently positive but lower than in the pre-1987 scenario.  
 
We also investigate whether, post-1986, some investors have increasingly started not only to 
react to the buy/sell signals when they are about to be generated (t=0), but also anticipate the 
emergence of new signals on the next day. In the extreme case where investors at day t=-1 
are able to predict the signal of day 0 and react instantaneously and correctly to this 
prediction, we would expect the price to follow a pattern given by curve E: the price at t=-1 
adjusts with no delays to the signal expected to be generated the following day. In this case, 
the return at t-1 would be higher post-1987 than before, the price increment between t=-1 and 
t=0 (i.e., return measured at t=0) would be identical in both subperiods, and lower for the 
subsequent days in the subperiod starting in 1987. If, however, the anticipating investors’ 
price impact is not full and instantaneous at t=-1 but takes a day to fully materialise (as 
shown by curve F), the returns in the post-1986 period would be higher in day t=0 as 
compared to the pre-1987 price behaviour. Needless to say, the abovementioned scenarios do 
not exhaust the full spectrum of possible price movements around the new signals and other 
patterns could also be observed in reality. Nonetheless, from these scenarios and general 
reasoning we can deduce several testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the MA rules work less well in the post-BLL period this is consistent with a 
move towards greater efficiency at least in respect of these rules, i.e., the rules will be less 
predictive of future returns. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If returns in the post-BLL period are higher (lower) immediately after a new 
buy (sell) signal and subsequently lower (higher) and negative (positive) during the rest of the 
buy (sell) period it appears than investors may be reacting too strongly to the signal. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If returns in the post-BLL period are higher (lower) immediately after a new 
buy (sell) signal and subsequently lower (higher) and positive (negative) during the rest of the 
buy (sell) period it appears than investors may be not reacting sufficiently strongly to the 
signal. 
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Hypothesis 4: If returns in the post BLL period are higher (lower) immediately before a new 
buy (sell) signal it appears that investors may be anticipating signals.  Associated with this is 
the possibility that, if investors anticipate signals and hence the related price adjustments, 
price movements after the signal may be more muted (less positive after a buy signal or less 
negative after a sell signal) as they have already been somewhat anticipated. 
 
Hypothesis 5: If new profitable rules closely related to the original rules have evolved in the 
post BLL period the market can be characterised as adapting to the new information rather 
than simply moving towards greater efficiency. 
 
5. Data 
The data used in this study are complete historical records of the daily prices of three long-
standing stock market indices, the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX from the US, UK and Japan 
respectively. These indices represent three of the most important and well established world 
markets and provide enough data to examine how successful the MA rule has been before 
and after the end of the sample used by BLL. We study the moving average rule over the 
period post-BLL, thus we examine 1st January 1987 to 31st December 2013. The daily return 
for each index is calculated as a difference in log index values. 
 
Table 1 documents the descriptive statistics of the three indices’ full samples as well as the 
subsample periods studied in this paper. The mean return for the DJIA during the post-BLL 
period is greater than the mean during the pre-BLL period, while the FT30 shows that the 
mean return during the post-BLL period is substantially lower than the mean return during 
the pre-BLL period. The mean for the TOPIX during the post-BLL period is actually negative 
in line with the poor performance of the market in Japan since 1987. The returns in all 
markets are non-normal with significant Jarque-Bera statistics. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Are MA rules still successful? 
Initially, the MA rule is examined over the full samples for each market to determine the 
overall success of the rule. Panel A of Table 2 presents the MA rule results for the DJIA and 
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the results show that from 1896 to 2013 each rule produced positive buy and negative sell 
returns, resulting in positive buy-sell differences which are all significant9. Although the 
(1,50,0.01) rule produces the greatest buy-sell difference, it is lower than BLL’s results, 
suggesting that the MA rule has less predictive power since 198710. Panel B documents the 
MA rule results for the FT30 and shows all buy (sell) returns to be positive (negative) and 
significant, leading to positive and significant buy-sell differences. The largest buy-sell 
difference is again associated with the (1,50,0.01) rule. The buy-sell differences are lower 
than those found by Hudson et al. (1996), again suggesting a weakening of the rule. Panel C 
reports the TOPIX results and indicate that all rules examined produce positive buy and 
negative sell returns, and positive buy-sell differences, all figures being significant. Looking 
at the magnitudes of returns across those three markets, this preliminary analysis suggests 
that the MA rule is more successful in the TOPIX than the DJIA or FT30 and that the rule’s 
predictability is not as strong as found in previous studies, indicating that the rule is not as 
predictive since BLL. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
To determine how the MA rule has performed since BLL’s study11, we examine the level of 
predictability of the rule since that seminal paper documented the success of the rule. Panel A 
of Table 3 presents the DJIA results and shows that none of the buy or sell returns is 
significant (and the latter are positive rather than negative), and the buy-sell differences are 
insignificant and most of them are actually negative in the post-BLL era. This indicates that 
there is no predictability from the MA rule. Although none of the rules are statistically 
significant, the fact that most buy-sell differences are now negative shows a complete 
reversal in the successfulness of the MA rule compared to the BLL results. Panel B shows for 
the FT30 that all six rules generate insignificant buy and sell returns; however, the buy-sell 
differences that are still positive and significant at 5%. This would indicate a weakening of 
                                                          
9 For consistency with most prior studies including, e.g.,  BLL, Hudson et al (1996) and Han et al (2013), in this 
and subsequent tables we calculate our t-statistics as follows. For buy (sells): (μr – μ).(σ2/N + σ2/Nr)-1/2, where μr 
and Nr are the mean returns and number of signals for the buys (sells); μ and N are the unconditional mean and 
number of observations;  σ2 is the estimated variance for the entire sample. For buy -sell: (μb – μs).(σ2/Nb + 
σ2/Ns)-1/2, where μb and Nb are the mean returns and number of signals for the buys;  μs and Ns are the mean 
returns and number of signals for the sells. 
10 We study 1987-2013 data while BLL used 1896-1986 data. 
11 To be precise we follow the related literature and investigate the period after the data period examined by 
BLL, i.e. 1987-2013.  Although the BLL paper was published in 1992, it used data up to 1986 and was probably 
public knowledge before it was officially published in the Journal of Finance. Thus, investors will probably 
have known about the success of the rule before the publication of the paper. 
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the technical rule in the FT30 since the BLL study and a decrease from the full sample which 
found each rule generated positive buy-sell differences which were significant at 1%. On the 
other hand, most of the sell returns, although insignificant, are on average more pronounced 
in the post-BLL period, leading to higher, not lower, buy-sell differences for the MA(1,200) 
rules post-BLL. Hence, the evidence for FT30 is mixed. The TOPIX results in Panel C show 
that all of the six rules generate positive buy-sell differences of which all but one are 
significant. However, the magnitudes of the buy-sell differences are lower than the full 
sample results, also indicating a weakening of the MA rule.  Further, the buy returns are 
lower post-BLL, the average sell returns seem to have increased in magnitude following the 
BLL sample, even though they seem more volatile and, hence, less significant.  
 
Overall, these results show that each market has seen a fall in the predictive power of the MA 
rule since 1987 compared to the full sample analysis. The MA rule in the DJIA from 1987-
2013 does not generate significant positive buy-sell differences, suggesting that investors 
may have taken advantage of the rule, eroding away the profits. The FT30 results suggest that 
although positive returns can still be made, they are no longer significant at the 1% level. 
This erosion in signalling power of the MA rules seems to have predominantly taken place 
for the buy signals. As for the UK, the decline in predictive power of the MA rules should be 
primarily contributed to a deterioration of buy signals’ strength; sell signals seem to generate 
higher, not lower, profits, even though their precision appears to have declined, too, as those 
returns are more volatile and less significant. The TOPIX however, still generates significant 
positive albeit lower buy-sell differences, indicating that the MA rule is less profitable when 
used in this market.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
These results of diminished profitability of MA rules in the post-BLL period support our 
Hypothesis 1 that there was a move towards greater efficiency at least in respect of these 
rules. This phenomenon could be driven by various forces: an increased awareness of MA 
rules’ historical profitability which resulted in their increase adoption by market participants, 
lower transaction costs due to technological advance, improved information flows courtesy of 
derivatives trading, or prevalence of sophisticated institutional investors. 
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6.2. Was the decline in profitability of MA rules to be expected? 
A finding of overall weaker predictive power of MA rules post-BLL does not have to be due 
to a structural break in the performance of MA rules occurring around year 1987. As an 
alternative explanation, one could hypothesise that the overall predictive power of MA rules 
would have been lower anyway in the post 1986 period, e.g., due to a long-term process of 
improving market efficiency. Hence, we analyse whether the changes in predictive power of 
MA rules could be explained as a simply continuation of trends originating in the BLL 
sample. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑎𝑎2 +(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑎𝑎2)𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡,   (3) 
 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 stands for average daily return from a MA strategy (we consider returns 
following buy and sell signals separately), calculated in 5 year windows and moving by three 
months in each step, t denotes the time trend, and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is a dummy equal to one in the post 
BLL period (starting 01/01/1987) and zero before that date.12 If the coefficients 𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2 are 
jointly significant, this would indicate a structural break in the linear or non-linear trend the 
MA returns follow; insignificance of 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽, on the other hand, would imply that there was no 
structural change of any form to the predictive power of the MA rules in the post-BLL era, 
and any difference in average MA returns pre- vs post-BLL should be fully attributed to the 
existence of long-term trends in MA returns which started before 1987 and simply continued 
beyond that date. Regression results, obtained by means of quantile regression technique to 
guarantee their robustness in presence of outliers (Koenker and Hallock, 2001), are presented 
in Table 4 and the corresponding observed and fitted values of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 are depicted in 
Figure 3.13 
 
[Table 4 and Figure 3 about here] 
 
For the MA(1,50) for the DJIA, the results show a significant change in the trends of average 
returns following the BLL paper, as indicated by significance of the F statistic. This suggests 
                                                          
12 We impose that date for the break as the literature is concerned with the change in MA rules’ profitability in 
the post-BLL sample, i.e., starting in 1987. Hence, this date is the most logicalobvious candidate for the timing 
of a break. When we allow the data to speak for itself and employ Andrews’ (1993) test for unknown break, the 
results (not reported to conserve space) are generally consistent with the notion that also the break occurred on 
or shortly (by a few years) after the date selected here. 
13 To conserve space, only the rules without the band are considered here. 
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that MA return behaviour in the post-BLL era is not a simple continuation of the pre-BLL 
trends. Specifically, the buy returns decline faster in the early post-BLL period, and sell 
returns experience an upward shift, especially pronounced around year 2000.  Both these 
changes indicate reduced rule effectiveness. For MA(1,150) and MA(1,200) returns, 
significant changes in (linear and/or quadratic) trends around year 1987 are also observed. 
Post-BLL changes for all three rules are highly significant, as indicated by joint significance 
test results. Overall, these results are in line with the observations from Tables 2-3 that post-
BLL buy and sell returns are closer to zero and, consequently, their differences are also closer 
to zero, and insignificant. Trends in the post-BLL era are not simple continuations of pre-
BLL trends, however, suggesting the existence of a structural change in MA returns around 
the end of the BLL sample. 
 
The results for FT30 MA(1,50) rule indicate that buy returns started to decline post-BLL, 
whereas sell returns experienced a shift upwards but started to recover (i.e., move down) 
post-BLL. Results for the remaining two strategies indicate that there were trends in average 
returns prior to 1987, and those trends changed significantly in the post-BLL era. However, 
whereas buys have experienced an initial upward shift followed by a decline over time in the 
post-BLL era, especially for MA(1,150), sells have shifted downwards in the post-BLL 
period, as compared to the trends they were following prior to 1987, especially the later 
indicating an improvement rather than deterioration in the signalling strength of MA 
strategies. Overall, the moving-windows results for the UK are mixed and only weakly 
support the notion that the predictive power of MA strategies deteriorated following the 
publication of the BLL results, as buy returns show an indication of a downward trend post-
BLL but sell returns indicate an increased, not weaker, signalling strength. Those 
observations are in line with the results in Tables 2 and 3. In all cases, however, do we find 
evidence of significant changes in trends of MA profitability around year 1987. 
 
For TOPIX, all but one trends in buy and sell returns undergo significant changes as they 
enter the post-BLL era. Following an initial jump, buy returns decline rapidly after entering 
the post-1986 period, at least until the end of the century. This decline is in line with the 
hypothesis that trading on MA signals intensified post-BLL, eroding the predicative power of 
MA rules. Sell returns experience a gradual recovery (i.e., a move downwards) at the 
beginning of the post-BLL period but start to deteriorate around year 2000. Overall, these 
results suggest that the observed lower average returns in the post-BLL era are due to lower 
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buy returns in that period, as reported in Table 3. This difference between pre- and post-BLL 
results (Tables 2 and 3) is not due to a simple continuation of pre-1987 trends in MA returns 
into the post-BLL period.  
 
Overall, these results demonstrate that changes in predictive power of MA rules following the 
BLL paper were not simple continuations of trends which originated before 1987. Rather, 
there was a structural break in the time-series behaviour of profits from MA rules around year 
1987. This supports the notion that market participants started to utilise the MA rules to a 
greater extent (maybe as a result of learning from the BLL study), which led to erosion of the 
predictive power of those rules. However, as discussed before, abrupt changes in other 
variables coinciding with publication of BLL results might have also caused the observed 
weakening of predictive power of MA rules post-1987. 
 
6.3. How did the markets adapt? 
To give an anatomy of the markets’ adaptation in the post 1986 period, we examine the 
returns to MA strategies on days around new buy/sell signals for the pre- and post-BLL 
samples. 14 We look at the one day before a new signal (t=-1), the day of the new signal (t=0) 
and the ten days subsequent to the new signal, as returns cumulated over the first five or ten 
days.  Panels A and B of Table 5 reports the returns around new buy and sell signals from 
different MA rules for the DJIA. All t=-1 returns are significant and positive (negative) prior 
to a buy (sell) signal, and the post-BLL returns are higher in magnitude than their pre-BLL 
counterparts. This indicates stronger price reactions post-BLL, in line with the hypothesis that 
trading based on anticipation of new signals intensified from 1987 onwards. This reasoning is 
further supported by the fact that t=0 returns are significant pre- but not post-BLL in all but 
one case, again in line with the notion of trading taking part in anticipation of the signal (at 
t=-1) rather than on the day of the signal in the post-BLL era, whereas pre-BLL significant 
price reactions at t=0 indicate that not all price adjustment took place at t=-1. In addition, for 
the MA(1,50) rule, returns in days 1-5 and/or 1-10 are significant and positive (negative for 
sells) only in the pre-BLL era, further suggesting that the entire price adjustment post-1986 
was taking place in anticipation of the signal rather than following it. 
 
                                                          
14 A new buy signal is a buy signal that is preceded by a sell or neutral signal, that is, it is the movement from a 
sell/neutral signal to a buy signal. 
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As for the FT30, returns on days prior to the signal are all significant and positive (negative) 
for new buys (sells), with those observed post-BLL higher in magnitude than their pre-BLL 
counterparts, with one exception. As for the US, this result is in line with stronger 
anticipation of and trading on new signals following BLL. The t=0 returns for all sells and 
MA(1,50) buys are significant pre-BLL but insignificant thereafter, again suggesting a shift 
of trading from the signal day to the preceding one, in anticipation of the signal. The 
cumulated returns forin five or ten days after the signal are significant only in the pre-BLL 
era (for MA(1,50) buys and MA(1,150) and MA(1,200) sells), again suggesting that the price 
adjustment process driven by trades continues after the signal in the pre-BLL period but takes 
place entirely in t=-1 post-BLL. 
 
The results for the TOPIX are broadly consistent with those for the US and UK. All t=-1 
returns are significant and positive (negative) for buys (sells) pre- and post-BLL, with the 
later higher in magnitude than the former, suggesting stronger price reactions post-BLL at t=-
1. The signal day returns appear to have diminished in the post-BLL era: buy returns are all 
lower and in two cases turn insignificant post-BLL, sell returns for MA(1,150) and 
MA(1,200) rules even turn positive post-BLL. These results further evidence an erosion of 
signalling power of MA rules post-BLL. In addition, in two out of three cases the cumulated 
returns following buy signals are positive and significant prior to but not after the BLL 
period, again supporting the notion that trades-driven price reactions to buy/sell signals 
mostly moved into day t=-1, in line with our hypothesis 4 that investors increasingly 
anticipated new signals in the post-BLL period.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Overall, the results are consistent across all three markets: price reactions at t=-1 became 
stronger and those at t=0 and following days weaker in the period after the BLL results 
became publically known. This finding is in line with our hypothesis 4, stating that investors 
anticipation new signals migrated their trades to day t=-1, to timely capitalise on their 
expectations. We do not find any evidence for hypothesis 2 or 3, however, i.e., there are no 
systematic over- or under-reactions to new MA signals post-1986. Given those findings, we 
further investigate whether investors can realise superior profits by predicting the signal in 
the post-BLL period. If the answer is positive, this will strongly support our interpretation of 
anticipatory trades. If not, it would be more difficult to argue that the observed price 
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behaviour is generated by investors acting on their predictions of new signals: if they are 
losing money, they are less likely to exert sustained impact on prices (although some price 
impact might result from investors timing long term trades they were intending to make in 
any event). The ability to realise profits by anticipating buy/sell signals will be examined in 
more detail next. 
 
6.4. Perfectly anticipated MA rules 
Since the original MA rule is less predictive post-1986, we examine the perfectly anticipated 
MA rules to determine whether these rules have predictive power in these three markets. 
Table 6 presents the results for the perfectly anticipated MA rule for the DJIA, FT30 and 
TOPIX for the sample period 1987-2013. We assume that investors can predict future trading 
signals from the rules perfectly and trade accordingly. It should be repeatedly stressed that we 
are not postulating that perfect predictions are possible in reality; rather, results from 
perfectly anticipated rules can be regarded as a benchmark for the maximum benefits 
obtainable from predicting signals. Panel A reports that the number of buy signals for each 
rule for the DJIA is greater than the number of sell signals. Also for each rule, the one-day 
buy returns are all positive and statistically significant, while the one-day sell returns are all 
negative and statistically significant. Unlike the results from original rules for the same 
period, these buy-sell differences are all positive and significant, suggesting that if investors 
had perfectly anticipated the following days’ signals, there was a significant predictive power 
from technical trading in 1987-2013. Panel B documents the results for the perfectly 
anticipated MA rule of the FT30 for the sample period 1987-2013. The number of buy signals 
exceeds the number of sell signals for each rule and the one-day buy returns are all positive, 
while the one-day sell returns are all negative and also significant. The buy-sell differences 
are all positive and all statistically significant. These buy-sell differences are greater than the 
original rules’ buy-sell differences for the same sample period, indicating that predicting the 
following day’s signal would be more successful than the original MA rule. Panel C 
documents the results for the perfectly anticipated MA rule for the TOPIX and shows that the 
number of buy and sell signals are quite similar and vary between rules as to which one is 
greater. The one-day buy returns are all positive and significant, while the one-day sell 
returns are all negative and significant.  The buy-sell differences are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Three of the rules produce buy-sell differences that 
are greater than the corresponding buy-sell differences under the original rules, indicating 
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that predicting the following days signal does not always produce returns greater than the 
original rules for the TOPIX. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Overall, these results show that the perfectly anticipated MA rules have high predictive 
power for the 1987-2013 period and that they tend to be more successful than the original 
MA rule, supporting our Hypothesis 4. In reality, investors would not be able to predict future 
trading signals perfectly. Rather, their realised profits would depend on individual investor’s 
forecasting ability, would probably vary over time and with market conditions, and be 
certainly lower than those obtainable under the assumption of perfect foresight.  
 
6.5. Trading on anticipated buy and sell signals 
From the literature and our own results, we know that the predictive power of MA rules 
prevailed in the pre-1987 period but deteriorated thereafter. Tables 7-10 document the results 
of using the “double or out” trading strategy on the post-BLL data for the original and the 
perfectly anticipated MA rule. Tables 7 shows that the original MA rule fails to generate 
positive roundtrip breakeven costs indicating no economic significance from the trading rule 
from 1987-2013.  The FT30 and TOPIX results both show that roundtrip breakeven costs are 
very low indicating that the original moving average rule marginally outperforms the two 
markets over the 1987-2013 period.  Table 8 shows the anticipated moving average rule 
results for the 1987-2013 period and shows that roundtrip breakeven costs are substantially 
higher (up to six times higher) than for the original moving average rule.  This suggests that 
anticipating signals yields superior returns and supports the notion that investors could have 
taken advantage of this fact and consequently influenced prices in anticipation of new signals, 
thus supporting our Hypothesis 4. 15 
 
[Tables 7-8 about here] 
 
Overall, these results show that both the anticipated MA rules have high predictive power for 
the 1987-2013 period and that they tend to be more successful than the original MA rule, 
                                                          
15 The results for the simple strategy are qualitatively similar and not reported to conserve space but available 
upon request. 
23 
 
supporting our Hypothesis 4. In reality, investors would not be able to predict future trading 
signals perfectly. Rather, their realised profits would depend on individual investor’s 
forecasting ability, would probably vary over time and with market conditions, and be 
certainly lower than those obtainable under the assumption of perfect foresight.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper has studied the MA rule using very long historical data for the US, UK and 
Japanese stock markets which includes a substantial amount of post BLL data. An 
examination of post-BLL data reveals that in the DJIA the MA rule has failed to generate any 
predictive power, and the FT30 and TOPIX results show its predictive power to have 
diminished. Further analysis shows that there was a structural break in the time-series 
behaviour of the profits from the MA rules in about 1987. 
 
When we look into the price behaviour process around days when new buy/sell signals are 
generated in the post BLL period, we find that, unlike in the pre-1987 era, prices react to 
those signals in advance, a day before they are generated by closing index values. In addition, 
prices in the US and the UK change less on days following signal emergence. Taken together, 
this evidence supports the notion that investors have learned when new buy/sell signals are 
generated. This supports our hypothesis 4 that investors may be anticipating signals. 
 
This interpretation is further tested by analysing the profits from anticipated trades in the 
post-BLL era: if those profits are low, one should not expect investors to engage in 
anticipatory trades, hence the anticipation of next days’ new signals would not offer a good 
explanation for the observed price patterns. To analyse potentially achievable profits from 
trading on anticipated signals, this paper suggests a modified MA rule, namely the perfectly 
anticipated rule, whereby the investor predicts the following days signal today. The results 
show that both the perfectly anticipated MA rule has a significant predictive power in all 
three markets over the post-BLL period, indicating that if investors can fairly accurately 
forecast the MA rule signal, the rule is still highly predictive. After accounting for reasonable 
transaction costs, we find that anticipating rules produce net profits higher than the buy-and-
hold strategy in the post-BLL era, and higher than what the profits from the original rules in 
this subperiod would have been. This result indicates that investors would have had 
incentives to engage in trading based on anticipated signals in the post-BLL period, which 
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would give rise to significant price reactions prior to, and not on, the days new signals are 
generated by the MA rules.  
 
The results in this paper suggest that investors may have become generally familiar with the 
MA rule in the post-1986 period, and/or it became less costly to implement those rules. Given 
this, as one would expect given the EMH, the predictive power declined. However, our 
results show that when investors realised that the returns from the rule were limited by the 
fact it was well known, some of them began adapting the rule by forecasting future signals. 
Hence, this finding is in line with predictions of the AMH (hypothesis 5), as a previously 
successful trading strategy no longer has predictive power but a more sophisticated rule is 
predictive, representing the evolution of the market.  
25 
 
References 
 
Atanasova, C.V. and Hudson, R.S. (2010). Technical trading rules and calendar anomalies - 
Are they the same phenomena? Economics Letters, 106(2), 128-130. 
Bajgrowicz, P., and Scaillet, O. (2012). Technical trading revisited: False discoveries, 
persistence tests, and transaction costs'. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(3), 473-
491. 
Bessembinder, H. and Chan, K. (1995). The profitability of technical trading rules in the 
Asian stock markets. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 3(2-3), 257-284. 
Bessembinder, H. and Chan, K. (1998). Market efficiency and the returns to technical 
analysis. Financial Management, 27(2), 5-27. 
Brock, W., Lakonishok, J. and LeBaron, B. (1992). Simple Technical Trading Rules and the 
Stochastic Properties of Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, 47(5), 1731-1764. 
Chen, C.-W., Huang, C.-S. and Lai, H.-W. (2009). The impact of data snooping on the testing 
of technical analysis: An empirical study of Asian stock markets. Journal of Asian 
Economics, 20(5), 580-591. 
Chong, T.T. and Ng, W. (2008). Technical analysis and the London stock exchange: testing 
the MACD and RSI rules using the FT30. Applied Economics Letters, 15(14), 1111-
1114. 
Cootner, P.H. (1962). Stock prices: random vs. systematic changes. Industrial Management 
Review, (3), 24-45. 
Day, T.E. and Wang, P. (2002). Dividends, nonsynchronous prices, and the returns from 
trading the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Journal of Empirical Finance, 9(4), 431-
454. 
Fama, E.F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of the Theory and Empirical Work. 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. 
Fama, E.F. and Blume, M.E. (1966). Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading. The Journal of 
Business, 39(1), 226-241. 
Fang, J., Jacobsen, B., Qin, Y. (2013). Predictability of the simple technical trading rules: An 
out-of-sample test. Review of Financial Economic, 23, 30-45.  
Fifield, S.G.M., Power, D.M. and Sinclair (2005). An analysis of trading strategies in eleven 
European stock markets. The European Journal of Finance, 11(6), 531-548. 
26 
 
Han, Y., Yang, K., Zhou, G. (2013). A New Anomaly: The Cross-Sectional Profitability of 
Technical Analysis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(5), 1433-
1461. 
Hudson, R., Dempsey, M. and Keasey, K. (1996). A note on the weak form efficiency of 
capital markets: The application of simple technical trading rules to UK stock prices - 
1935 to 1994. Journal of Banking & Finance, 20(6), 1121-1132. 
Hull, M., McGroarty, F. (2014). Do emerging markets become more efficient as they 
develop? Long memory persistence in equity indices. Emerging Markets Review, 18, 
45-61. 
Ito, A. (1999). Profits on technical trading rules and time-varying expected returns: evidence 
from Pacific-Basin equity markets. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7(3-4), pp. 283-
330. 
Ito, M., Sugiyama, S. (2009). Measuring the degree of time varying market inefficiency. 
Economics Letters 103(1), 62-64. 
James, F.E., Jr. (1968). Monthly Moving Averages--An Effective Investment Tool? The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 3(3), 315-326. 
Jensen, M.C. and Benington, G.A. (1970). Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some 
Additional Evidence.  The Journal of Finance, 25(2), 469-482. 
Kim, J. H., Shamsuddin, A., Lim, K. P. (2011). Stock return predictability and the adaptive 
markets hypothesis: Evidence from century-long U.S. data. Journal of Empirical 
Finance 18(5), 868-879. 
Koenker, R. and Hallock, K.F. (2001). Quantile Regression. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, 143–156. 
Lebaron, B. (2000). The Stability of Moving Average Technical Trading Rules on the Dow 
Jones Index. Derivatives Use, Trading, and Regulation, 5(4), 324--338. 
Lim, K. P., Brooks, R. D. (2006). The Evolving and Relative Efficiencies of Stock Markets: 
Empirical Evidence from Rolling Bicorrelation Tests Statistics. SSRN Working 
Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931071. 
Lim, K. P., Luo, W., Kim, J. H. (2013). Are US stock index returns predictable? Evidence 
from automatic autocorrelation-based tests. Applied Economics 45(8), 953-962. 
Lo, A.W. (2004). The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis. Journal of Portfolio Management, 30, 
15-29. 
27 
 
Lo, A.W. and Hasanhodzic, J. (2010). The Evolution of Technical Analysis: Financial 
Prediction from Babylonian Tablets to Bloomberg Terminals. USA: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Manahov, V., Hudson, R. (2014). A note on the relationship between market efficiency and 
adaptability – New evidence from artificial stock markets. Expert Systems with 
Applications, 41(16), 7436-7454. 
Menkhoff, L. (2010). The use of technical analysis by fund managers: International evidence. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(11), 2573-2586. 
Metghalchi, M., Marcucci, J. and Chang, Y.-H. (2012). Are moving average trading rules 
profitable? Evidence from the European stock markets. Applied Economics, 44(12), 
1239-1559. 
Park, C. and Irwin, S.H. (2007). What do we know about the profitability of technical 
analysis? Journal of Economic Surveys, 21(4), 786-826. 
Ready, M. (2002). Profits from technical trading rules. Financial Management, 31(3), 43-61. 
Schulmeister, S. (2009). Profitability of Technical Stock Trading: Has it moved from daily to 
intraday data? Review of Financial Economics, 18(4), 190-201. 
Shynkevich, A. (2012). Performance of technical analysis in growth and small cap segments 
of the US equity market.  Journal of Banking & Finance, 36, 193-208. 
Smith, G. (2012). The changing and relative efficiency of European emerging stock markets. 
European Journal of Finance, 18(8), 689-708. 
Sullivan, R., Timmermann, A. and White, H. (1999). Data-Snooping, Technical Trading Rule 
Performance, and the Bootstrap. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1647-1691. 
Taylor, N. (2014). The rise and fall of technical trading rule success. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 40, 286-302. 
Todea, A., Zoicas-Ienciu, A., and Filip, A. (2009). Profitability of the Moving Average 
Strategy and the Episodic Dependencies: Empirical Evidence from European Stock 
Markets.  European Research Studies, XII(1), 63-72. 
Urquhart, A. and Hudson, R. (2013). Efficient or adaptive markets? Evidence from major 
stock markets using very long run historic data. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 28, 130-142. 
Urquhart, A., and McGroarty, F. (2014). Calendar effects, market conditions and the 
Adaptive Market Hypothesis: Evidence from long-run U.S. data. International Review 
of Financial Analysis, 35, 154-166. 
28 
 
Van Horne, J.C. and Parker, G.G.C. (1967). The Random-Walk Theory: An Empirical Test. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 23(6), 87-92. 
Van Horne, J.C. and Parker, G.G.C. (1968). Technical Trading Rules: A Comment. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 24(4), 128-132. 
Zhou, J., Lee, J. M. (2013). Adaptive market hypothesis: evidence from the REIT market. 
Applied Financial Economics, 23(21), 1649-1662. 
 
   
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0) 18851 12981 0.000445** 
(2.47) 
-0.000161*** 
(-3.17) 
0.54 0.50 0.000606*** 
(4.53) 
(1,50,1) 15494 9890 0.000525*** 
(3.07) 
-0.000199*** 
(-3.17) 
0.54 0.50 0.000724*** 
(4.45) 
(1,150,0) 19803 11929 0.000386* 
(1.92) 
-0.000117*** 
(-2.68) 
0.53 0.50 0.000503*** 
(3.58) 
(1,150,1) 18078 10240 0.000408** 
(2.36) 
-0.000161*** 
(-2.62) 
0.54 0.50 0.000570*** 
(3.63) 
(1,200,0) 20291 11391 0.000381* 
(1.94) 
-0.000148*** 
(-2.85) 
0.53 0.50 0.000529*** 
(3.66) 
(1,200,1) 18833 10072 0.000394** 
(2.13) 
-0.000172*** 
(-2.84) 
0.54 0.50 0.000566*** 
(3.59) 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 11879 8269 0.000557 
(3.19) 
-0.000399*** 
(3.19) 
0.51 0.48 0.000956*** 
(5.96) 
(1,50,1) 9762 6452 0.000597*** 
(3.30) 
-0.000526*** 
(-4.54) 
0.52 0.48 0.00112*** 
(5.88) 
(1,150,0) 12239 7810 0.000386* 
(1.85) 
-0.000193** 
(-2.49) 
0.51 0.48 0.000580*** 
(3.49) 
(1,150,1) 11045 6760 0.000451** 
(1.99) 
-0.000262*** 
(-3.07) 
0.51 0.48 0.000714*** 
(3.87) 
(1,200,0) 12352 7647 0.000413** 
(2.08) 
-0.000249*** 
(-2.85) 
0.51 0.48 0.000662*** 
(3.94) 
(1,200,1) 11523 6881 0.000419** 
(2.14) 
-0.000240*** 
(-2.64) 
0.51 0.48 0.000659*** 
(3.64) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 9621 6763 0.000786*** 
(3.84) 
-0.000455*** 
(-4.85) 
0.53 0.45 0.001241*** 
(7.02) 
(1,50,1) 8148 5366 0.000902*** 
(4.46) 
-0.000517*** 
(-4.84) 
0.54 0.45 0.001420*** 
(6.86) 
(1,150,0) 9458 5783 0.000626*** 
(2.65) 
-0.000309*** 
(-3.67) 
0.53 0.45 0.000936*** 
(4.98) 
(1,150,1) 8798 5146 0.000692*** 
(3.06) 
-0.000298*** 
(-3.44) 
0.53 0.44 0.000989*** 
(4.89) 
(1,200,0) 9598 5593 0.000540** 
(2.07) 
-0.000210*** 
(-2.96) 
0.53 0.45 0.000750*** 
(3.92) 
(1,200,1) 9063 5107 0.000575** 
(2.28) 
-0.000256*** 
(-3.13) 
0.53 0.44 0.000831*** 
(4.07) 
 
Table 2: Test Results for the Moving Average Rules full sample. N(Buys) and N(Sells) are the number of buy and sell signals.  No. Buy > 0 
and No. Sell > 0 are the number of buy and sell returns. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of daily returns of each market.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the Jarque-Bera 
statistic. 
  Obs Mean S.D. Max Min Skewness Kurtosis JB 
 
DJIA 
Full sample 31881 0.000198 0.010876 0.14 -0.26 -0.54 23.93 583421.9*** 
Pre-Brock 25039 0.000166 0.010673 0.14 -0.14 -0.12 15.68 167915.7*** 
Post-Brock 6842 0.000317 0.011587 0.11 -0.26 -1.74 45.30 513494.4*** 
 
FT30 
Full sample 20198 0.000165 0.010616 0.11 -0.12 -0.20 12.22 71702.33*** 
Pre-Brock 13157 0.000194 0.009979 0.11 -0.10 0.08 13.15 56438.51*** 
Post-Brock 7041 0.000110 0.011715 0.09 -0.12 -0.52 10.70 17727.79*** 
 
TOPIX 
Full sample 16433 0.000287 0.128646 0.13 -0.16 -0.52 15.41 106266.0*** 
Pre-Brock 9389 0.000522 0.007798 0.06 -0.09 -0.78 12.74 38046.0*** 
Post-Brock 7044 -0.000026 0.013077 0.12 -0.16 -0.35 12.21 25012.25*** 
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Table 3: Test Results for the Moving Average Rules 1987-2013.  N(Buys) and N(Sells) are the number of buy and sell signals.  No. Buy > 0 
and No. Sell > 0 are the number of buy and sell returns greater than zero. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0) 4420 2372 0.000239 
(0.24) 
0.000395 
(0.37) 
0.52 0.54 -0.000156 
(-0.45) 
(1,50,1) 3649 1720 0.000138 
(0.65) 
0.000467 
(0.55) 
0.52 0.54 -0.000329 
(-0.74) 
(1,150,0) 4659 2033 0.000326 
(0.06) 
0.000279 
(0.11) 
0.52 0.54 0.000047 
(0.14) 
(1,150,1) 4244 1630 0.000373 
(0.26) 
0.000306 
(-0.04) 
0.52 0.54 0.000067 
(0.21) 
(1,200,0) 4783 1859 0.000288 
(0.08) 
0.000352 
(0.15) 
0.38 0.53 -0.000065 
(-0.21) 
(1,200,1) 4403 1541 0.000302 
(0.14) 
0.000406 
(0.41) 
0.38 0.53 -0.000105 
(-0.32) 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 4112 2878 0.000318 
(1.03) 
-0.000259 
(-1.31) 
0.50 0.51 0.000577* 
(1.87) 
(1,50,1) 3418 2226 0.000336 
(1.04) 
-0.000401* 
(-1.69) 
0.50 0.51 0.000737** 
(1.98) 
(1,150,0) 4124 2766 0.000262 
(0.88) 
-0.000246 
(-1.15) 
0.51 0.49 0.000508 
(1.58) 
(1,150,1) 3726 2421 0.000345 
(1.20) 
-0.000283 
(-1.23) 
0.51 0.49 0.000628* 
(1.76) 
(1,200,0) 4077 2763 0.000328 
(1.16) 
-0.000340 
(-1.50) 
0.51 0.49 0.000668** 
(2.07) 
(1,200,1) 3842 2495 0.000329 
(1.14) 
-0.000280 
(-1.23) 
0.51 0.49 0.000609* 
(1.75) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 3478 3516 0.000453* 
(1.85) 
-0.000545* 
(-1.83) 
0.49 0.45 0.000998*** 
(3.19) 
(1,50,1) 2936 2913 0.000563** 
(2.25) 
-0.000494 
(-1.64) 
0.50 0.45 0.001057*** 
(2.99) 
(1,150,0) 3341 3553 0.000366 
(1.56) 
-0.000468 
(-1.50) 
0.50 0.44 0.000834*** 
(2.67) 
(1,150,1) 3104 3295 0.000485** 
(2.01) 
-0.000397 
(-1.24) 
0.50 0.45 0.000882*** 
(2.72) 
(1,200,0) 3263 3581 0.000263 
(1.20) 
-0.000376 
(-1.13) 
0.50 0.45 0.000640** 
(2.05) 
(1,200,1) 3054 3355 0.000275 
(1.23) 
-0.000331 
(-0.96) 
0.50 0.45 0.000607* 
(1.85) 
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Table 4: Trends in MA returns. The table presents results from estimations of the following models: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑎𝑎2 +(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑎𝑎2)𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡, where 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 stands for average daily returns 
from a MA strategy, calculated in 5 year windows moving by three months in each step; t denotes the time trend, and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is a dummy equal to one in the post BLL period (starting 01/01/1987) and zero before that 
date. Parameter values in the table are multiplied by 100,000. Estimates obtained by means of quantile regression technique. ‘F-stat (p-val)’ refer to results of a test with the Null of:  
𝛽𝛽0 = 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2 = 0. 
 
 
MA(1,50) Buys MA(1,50) Sells MA(1,150) Buys MA(1,150) Sells MA(1,200) Buys MA(1,200) Sells 
 
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value Parameter t-value Parameter t-value Parameter t-value Parameter t-value 
Panel A: DJIA 
𝛼𝛼0 42.9000 8.90 -25.0700 -3.67 63.8700 12.22 -26.9500 -3.17 42.6200 8.71 -25.7600 -3.53 
𝛼𝛼1 0.1080 2.36 -0.0370 -0.57 -0.1890 -3.81 0.1550 1.92 0.0313 0.67 0.1540 2.22 
𝛼𝛼2 -0.0003 -2.85 0.0001 1.00 0.0003 3.44 -0.0003 -1.86 -0.0001 -1.40 -0.0003 -2.19 
𝛽𝛽0 2572.54 4.91 -2723.87 -3.67 3237.30 5.70 -6664.46 -7.20 3379.52 6.35 -13083.21 -16.50 
𝛽𝛽1 -9.1500 -4.89 10.6500 4.01 -11.1900 -5.52 24.1800 7.32 -11.8500 -6.24 47.3400 16.72 
𝛽𝛽2 0.0081 4.86 -0.0101 -4.28 0.0095 5.25 -0.0215 -7.32 0.0103 6.12 -0.0423 -16.79 
F stat (p-val) 13.5 (<0.01) 21.76 (<0.01) 20.38 (<0.01) 20.84 (<0.01) 19.48 (<0.01) 103.48 (<0.01) 
Panel B: FT30 
𝛼𝛼0 60.2500 7.76 -69.1800 -5.63 -3.5700 -0.54 -7.4100 -0.50 -2.8400 -0.38 -2.2600 -0.16 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.0922 -0.70 0.1640 0.78 0.7260 6.49 -0.5810 -2.30 0.6820 5.40 -0.7370 -2.98 
𝛼𝛼2 0.0004 0.94 0.0004 0.53 -0.0024 -6.03 0.0035 3.83 -0.0021 -4.74 0.0041 4.62 
𝛽𝛽0 475.23 1.98 946.94 2.49 850.34 4.19 -1072.48 -2.34 817.42 3.57 -555.46 -1.24 
𝛽𝛽1 -2.3800 -1.69 -4.8200 -2.16 -5.1100 -4.29 7.2400 2.70 -5.1700 -3.85 4.8000 1.82 
𝛽𝛽2 0.0025 1.19 0.0055 1.66 0.0082 4.67 -0.0136 -3.44 0.0085 4.30 -0.0112 -2.88 
F stat (p-val) 11.21 (<0.01) 14.99 (<0.01) 29.17 (<0.01) 13.97 (<0.01) 12.57 (<0.01) 27.45 (<0.01) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
𝛼𝛼0 124.6300 15.22 -47.2400 -3.04 100.5500 7.42 -6.3800 -0.49 104.5200 7.62 3.9400 0.26 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.9240 -4.47 -0.3720 -0.95 -0.7200 -2.11 -0.7380 -2.26 -1.0100 -2.91 -0.8470 -2.23 
𝛼𝛼2 0.0035 3.24 0.0044 2.11 0.0026 1.42 0.0060 3.48 0.0038 2.05 0.0082 4.05 
𝛽𝛽0 759.92 6.72 782.44 3.65 -4.57 -0.02 1743.63 9.75 667.10 3.52 1637.40 7.86 
𝛽𝛽1 -5.0800 -5.56 -5.6600 -3.26 0.7750 0.51 -12.2800 -8.50 -4.5700 -2.98 -11.2600 -6.69 
𝛽𝛽2 0.0069 3.37 0.0070 1.82 -0.0037 -1.10 0.0174 5.40 0.0063 1.85 0.0134 3.57 
F stat (p-val) 21.5 (<0.01) 9.71 (<0.01) 2.09 (0.101) 58.97 (<0.01) 5.53 (<0.01) 56.4 (<0.01) 
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Table 5: The average returns the day before and various days after a new buy/sell signal in the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX. T-values in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
    
  Days Relative to New Signal Day (t=0) Days Relative to New Signal Day (t=0) Days Relative to New Signal Day (t=0) 
 
-1st 0 1st 
Cum 1st-
5th 
Cum 1st-
10th -1st 0 1st 
Cum 1st-
5th 
Cum 1st-
10th -1st 0 1st 
Cum 1st-
5th 
Cum 1st-
10th 
Panel A: DJIA New Buys Panel C: FT30 New Buys Panel A: DJIA New Buys 
Pre-Brock 
Average 
1,50,0 
0.01108*** 0.00116*** -0.00018 0.00153* 0.00277** 0.01048*** 0.00163*** 0.00091* 0.00191 0.00396* 0.00962*** 0.00223*** 0.0011** 0.00235* 0.00343 
(29.35) (3.14) (-0.51) (1.82) (2.10) (17.83) (3.02) (1.66) (1.48) (1.82) (19.18) (4.13) (2.38) (1.67) (1.60) 
Post-Brock 
Average 
0.01275*** 0.000764 0.00020 -0.00004 0.00228 0.01224*** 0.00073 0.00090 0.00071 0.00140 0.01443*** 0.00077 -0.00003 0.00109 -0.00010 
(21.81) (1.19) (0.34) (-0.03) (0.24) (19.04) (1.05) (1.46) (0.49) (0.71) (20.08) (1.11) (-0.04) (-0.58) (0.04) 
Pre-Brock 
Average 
1,150,0 
0.01115*** 0.00175*** -0.00014 0.00133 0.00245 0.01161*** 0.00052 0.00061 -0.00004 0.00248 0.00871*** 0.00289*** 0.00083 0.00144 0.0029 
(22.60) (3.59) (-0.32) (1.16) (1.35) (13.78) (0.70) (0.85) (-0.03) (0.97) (13.01) (4.02) (1.05) (0.84) (1.11) 
Post-Brock 
Average 
0.01274*** -0.00064 0.00022 0.00038 0.00231 0.01267*** -0.00077 0.00037 0.00101 0.00216 0.01325*** 0.00091 0.00107 0.00095 0.00544 
(17.11) (-0.91) (0.30) (0.23) (1.00) (14.67) (-0.94) (0.44) (0.50) (0.79) (12.08) (0.80) (1.00) (0.39) (1.43) 
Pre-Brock 
Average 
1,200,0 
0.01175*** 0.0021*** 0.00021 0.0009 0.00153 0.01074*** 0.00043 0.00132 0.00149 0.00308 0.01024*** 0.00156 0.00072 0.00298 0.00517* 
(14.59) (3.76) (0.39) (0.64) (0.85) (13.71) (0.47) (1.60) (0.81) (1.04) (10.46) (1.57) (1.12) (1.57) (1.91) 
Post-Brock 
Average 
0.01286*** 0.00059 0.00019 0.00058 0.00019 0.01195*** -0.00003 0.00034 0.00130 0.00175 0.01311*** 0.00083 0.00088 -0.00095 -0.00060 
(16.53) (0.71) (0.24) (0.32) (0.07) (11.31) (-0.03) (0.34) (0.55) (0.35) (11.39) (0.76) (0.84) (-0.38) (-0.16) 
 Panel B:DJIA New Sells Panel D: FT30 New Sells Panel A: DJIA New Sells 
Pre-Brock 
Average 
1,50,0 
-0.01162*** -0.0015*** -0.00012 -0.00171* -0.00092 -0.01151*** -0.00203*** -0.00044 -0.00051 -0.00213 -0.01017*** -0.00098* 0.00015 -0.00228 -0.00205 
(-31.82) (-3.76) (-0.29) (-1.91) (-0.67) (-18.80) (-2.98) (-0.79) (-0.40) (-1.19) (-13.75) (-1.71) (0.24) (-1.41) (-0.92) 
Post-Brock 
Average 
-0.01349*** -0.00035 0.00037 0.00129 0.00476 -0.01258*** -0.00101 0.00083 -0.00007 -0.00161 -0.01310*** -0.00187* -0.00166 -0.00320* -0.00493* 
(-20.19) (0.59) (0.62) (0.41) (0.03) (-18.28) (-1.23) (1.13) (-0.05) (-0.79) (-21.43) (-1.79) (-1.60) (-1.74) (-1.95) 
Pre-Brock 
Average 
1,150,0 
-0.01175*** -0.00113* 0.00048 0.00017 -0.00048 -0.01247*** -0.00169** -0.00044 -0.00209 -0.0041 -0.00983*** -0.00148 -0.0016 0.00064 0.00169 
(-23.82) (-1.90) (0.82) (0.13) (-0.23) (-18.55) (-2.33) (-0.54) (-1.28) (-1.76) (-8.73) (-1.56) (-1.18) (0.32) (0.55) 
Post-Brock 
Average 
-0.01359*** -0.00027 0.00098 -0.00006 0.00145 -0.01277*** -0.00075 0.00054 -0.00046 0.00105 -0.01621*** 0.00149 0.00012 -0.00189 -0.00352 
(-14.87) (-0.26) (1.09) (-0.03) (0.54) (-11.98) (-0.54) (0.48) (-0.20) (0.36) (-7.51) (0.77) (0.09) (-0.60) (-0.78) 
Pre-Brock 
Average 
1,200,0 
-0.01178*** -0.00051 0.001 0.00024 -0.00258 -0.01211*** -0.00177** -0.00109 -0.0032 -0.00501* -0.01193*** -0.00003 0.00066 0.00229 0.00376 
(-19.39) (-0.80) (1.48) (0.17) (-1.08) (-15.29) (-2.17) (-1.28) (-1.41) (-1.67) (-7.24) (-0.03) (0.56) (1.01) (1.18) 
Post-Brock 
Average 
-0.01387*** -0.00007 -0.00184 -0.00215 0.00212 -0.01296*** -0.00137 0.00071 -0.00206 0.00009 -0.01768*** 0.00012 0.00035 -0.00190 -0.00301 
(-14.35) (-0.06) (-0.79) (-0.89) (0.81) (-8.70) (-0.70) (0.52) (-0.72) (0.03) (-7.60) (0.06) (0.23) (-0.60) (-0.75) 
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Table 6: Test Results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule from 1987 – 2013. N(Buys) and N(Sells) are the number of buy and sell 
signals reported during the sample.  Buy >0 and Sell >0 are the fraction of buy and sell returns greater than zero.   ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
 N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0) 4419 2372 0.001679*** 
(6.18) 
-0.002290*** 
(-9.33) 
0.52 0.54 0.003969*** 
(11.44) 
(1,50,1) 3648 1720 0.001932*** 
(6.39) 
-0.002885*** 
(-10.51) 
0.52 0.54 0.004817*** 
(10.94) 
(1,150,0) 4340 2351 0.001670*** 
(6.14) 
-0.002292*** 
(-9.23) 
0.52 0.54 0.003962*** 
(11.35) 
(1,150,1) 3578 1709 0.001919*** 
(6.32) 
-0.002873*** 
(-10.37) 
0.51 0.54 0.004791*** 
(10.82) 
(1,200,0) 4783 1858 0.000940 
(1.26) 
-0.001372** 
(-2.34) 
0.53 0.53 0.002312*** 
(3.93) 
(1,200,1) 4403 1541 0.000925 
(1.33) 
-0.001562** 
(-2.33) 
0.52 0.53 0.002487*** 
(3.76) 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 4112 2878 0.001715*** 
(7.09) 
-0.002254*** 
(-8.99) 
0.50 0.51 0.003969*** 
(13.01) 
(1,50,1) 3418 2226 0.001995*** 
(7.67) 
-0.002846*** 
(-10.35) 
0.50 0.51 0.004841*** 
(13.22) 
(1,150,0) 4124 2766 0.001011*** 
(4.12) 
-0.001366*** 
(-5.38) 
0.51 0.49 0.002377*** 
(7.39) 
(1,150,1) 3726 2421 0.001048*** 
(4.13) 
-0.001558*** 
(-5.84) 
0.51 0.49 0.002607*** 
(7.34) 
(1,200,0) 4077 2763 0.000838*** 
(3.34) 
-0.001090*** 
(-4.33) 
0.51 0.49 0.001928*** 
(5.97) 
(1,200,1) 3842 2495 0.000866*** 
(3.76) 
-0.001326*** 
(-4.71) 
0.51 0.49 0.002192*** 
(6.29) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 3477 3516 0.002112*** 
(7.95) 
-0.002185*** 
(-7.89) 
0.49 0.45 0.004297*** 
(13.93) 
(1,50,1) 2935 2913 0.002349*** 
(8.86) 
-0.002709*** 
(-8.55) 
0.50 0.45 0.005058*** 
(14.43) 
(1,150,0) 3340 3553 0.001120*** 
(4.29) 
-0.001177 
(-4.12)*** 
0.50 0.44 0.002297*** 
(7.40) 
(1,150,1) 3103 3295 0.001201*** 
(4.88) 
-0.001346*** 
(-4.10) 
0.50 0.45 0.002547*** 
(7.78) 
(1,200,0) 3262 3581 0.001005*** 
(3.86) 
-0.001052*** 
(-3.63) 
0.50 0.45 0.002057*** 
(6.63) 
(1,200,1) 3053 3355 0.001043*** 
(4.14) 
-0.001158*** 
(-3.72) 
0.50 0.45 0.002201*** 
(6.77) 
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Table 8: Test results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule using the double or out trading strategy on the 1987-2013 data for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns (rule profit/B&H profit).  The annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies, while the breakeven costs represent the percentage roundtrip 
trading costs that would eliminate the difference between the rule profits and the B&H strategy. 
 Rule No. of 
Buy 
No. of 
Sell  
Rule Profit B&H 
Profit 
Difference Annualised % 
Difference 
Breakeven Costs 
(%) 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  242 242 2790643.58 8.60 324458.32 60.00% 5.18% 
 (1,50,1)  279 206 1325180.09 8.60 154074.03 55.65% 4.87% 
(1,150,0) 238 237 1978000.22 8.60 229975.13 57.97% 5.13% 
(1,150,1) 276 203 918739.45 8.60 106818.61 53.55% 4.78% 
(1,200,0) 123 122 8040.03 8.60 934.79 28.83% 5.51% 
(1,200,1) 115 116 3435.61 8.60 399.45 24.84% 5.12% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 231 231 1339199.34 2.10 637029.25 64.05% 5.70% 
(1,50,1) 240 206 837290.89 2.10 398281.85 61.22% 5.70% 
(1,150,0) 99 121 4180.43 2.10 1988.54 32.49% 6.79% 
(1,150,1) 90 117 2471.08 2.10 1175.44 29.93% 6.72% 
(1,200,0) 83 83 924.45 2.10 439.74 25.28% 7.20% 
(1,200,1) 73 101 776.64 2.10 369.43 24.48% 6.68% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 209 209 2386038.47 0.83 2862883.39 73.44% 6.99% 
(1,50,1) 196 221 973363.54 0.83 1167888.26 67.77% 6.59% 
(1,150,0) 85 85 1777.99 0.83 2133.32 32.83% 8.82% 
(1,150,1) 79 101 1726.80 0.83 2071.90 32.69% 8.31% 
(1,200,0) 78 78 705.12 0.83 846.03 28.36% 8.46% 
(1,200,1) 79 90 584.27 0.83 701.04 27.47% 7.61% 
 
 
Table 7: Test results for the moving average rule using the double or out trading strategy on the 1987-2013 data for each market.  The 
number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold strategy as well 
as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns (rule profit/B&H profit).  The annualised % difference in 
profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies, while the breakeven costs represent the percentage roundtrip trading costs 
that would eliminate the difference between the rule profits and the B&H strategy. 
 Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference Breakeven Costs (%) 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  243 242 8.26 8.60 -0.98 -0.15% -0.02% 
 (1,50,1)  280 206 2.73 8.60 -0.32 -4.16% -0.47% 
(1,150,0) 142 141 20.85 8.60 2.42 3.33% 0.62% 
(1,150,1) 154 133 23.70 8.60 2.76 3.83% 0.71% 
(1,200,0) 123 123 15.67 8.60 1.82 2.25% 0.49% 
(1,200,1) 115 116 14.26 8.60 1.66 1.89% 0.44% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 232 231 13.71 2.10 6.54 7.20% 0.81% 
(1,50,1) 241 206 9.93 2.10 4.73 5.93% 0.69% 
(1,150,0) 122 121 8.67 2.10 4.13 5.39% 1.16% 
(1,150,1) 115 117 13.10 2.10 6.24 7.02% 1.57% 
(1,200,0) 84 84 14.49 2.10 6.91 7.42% 2.30% 
(1,200,1) 74 101 12.54 2.10 5.97 6.84% 2.03% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 210 209 23.38 0.83 28.06 13.14% 1.59% 
(1,50,1) 197 221 27.26 0.83 332.71 13.79% 1.66% 
(1,150,0) 86 85 11.52 0.83 13.82 10.22% 3.05% 
(1,150,1) 80 101 20.33 0.83 24.39 12.56% 3.50% 
(1,200,0) 79 78 5.58 0.83 6.69 7.29% 2.41% 
(1,200,1) 80 90 5.38 0.83 6.46 7.15% 2.18% 
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Figure 2: Different price adjustment paths around a new buy signal at t=0. 
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Figure 1: Stylised view of market movements in the pre-BLL (solid line) and post-BLL (dashed line) period 
 
Note: The lines represent stylised price movements under different assumptions: A: pre-BLL period 
with no significant trading on MA signals, B: overreaction to a buy signal, C: efficient response to a 
buy signal, D: sluggish/under-reaction to a buy signal,  E: full reaction at t=-1to anticipated signal, F: 
partial reaction at t=-1 to anticipated signal. 
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Figure 3: Moving window estimates of average MA daily returns. The solid volatile line represents returns 
following a buy (left) and sell (right) signals generated by each rule, calculated as mean daily returns in a 5 year 
window which moves by three months in each step. The dashed (dotted) line represents the upper (lower) bound 
of the 95% confidence interval for those returns. The solid vertical line denotes the end of the BLL sample 
(01/01/1987). The solid smooth line represents the fitted regression line (model (3)). 
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FT30 
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TOPIX 
MA(1,50) BUY        MA(1,50) SELL 
    
 
MA(1,150) BUY     MA(1,150) SELL 
    
 
MA(1,200) BUY     MA(1,200) SELL 
    
 
 
 
 
-.0
04
-.0
02
0
.0
02
.0
04
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-.0
04
-.0
02
0
.0
02
.0
04
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-.0
03
-.0
02
-.0
01
0
.0
01
.0
02
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-.0
05
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-.0
04
-.0
02
0
.0
02
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-.0
1
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
